CONTEXT/BACKGROUND

The growth of informal settlements in Kenya dates back to the colonial period. Nairobi, founded as a station on the Mombasa-Uganda railway line in 1899, quickly became the focal point of the British colonial strategy in British East Africa and was declared the territory’s capital in 1907. During this period, British colonial rulers increasingly “saw East Africa as a hinterland for Nairobi” (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986: 203). Flourishing intra-regional trading networks between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda would drive Nairobi’s manufacturing industry, and at the same time, encourage rural-urban migration to the capital. A series of protective laws passed in 1915 banned non-whites from owning land both in the country’s’ hinterland’s rich agricultural areas and Nairobi. Crucially, this would push Africans into squatters’ settlements and render land ownership beyond the reach of the lower classes, who were predominantly African and South Asian.

The British colonial administration initially allowed Nairobi “to grow with no proper survey or control” (Home, 1997: 44). However, after a period of sustained economic growth in the 1940s, British colonial rulers devised Nairobi’s first master plan in 1948 that sought to shape Nairobi’s growth over the preceding 25 years. This approach was heavily influenced by European city planning and was not designed with Kenyan topography in mind. The plan specifically targeted the building of “new administrative buildings set in landscaped public spaces, a modern commercial center, a greatly enlarged industrial area to attract investment, a vastly improved transport system, and the construction of new African housing estates” only meant for African servants working for British (Anderson, 2010: 138). The plan excluded African inhabited parts of the city.

Once Kenya gained independence in 1963, autocratic leadership, poor governance and planning structures adopted by the African elite served to further entrench class segregation and social exclusion of the poor (Huchzermeyer, 2011). The reversal of the native restriction law after independence, poor agricultural rural land and lack of employment opportunities in the rural areas forced people, especially the youth, to move to urban areas in large numbers (K’Akumu & Olima, 2007). The rapid urbanization and the lack of plans to accommodate the newcomers to the city only served to exacerbate the housing situation as people were forced to construct makeshifts and substandard housing.

Global concerns and a call to slum free cities in the 1970’s prompted the Kenyan government to devise ways to respond to slums. Over the years, the government of Kenya has experimented with different settlement development policies and strategies, ranging from forced eviction, resettlement, site and services schemes and upgrading (UN-HABITAT, 2008). Until 2000, when the UN member countries developed and adopted the Millennium Development Goals, which focus on slum upgrading/improvement, forced eviction was the dominant form of slum eradication in Kenya. MDG Goal 7 seeks “a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers” by the year 2020 (MDGs, 2000).
After the adoption of the MDGs, Kenya, a signatory to the UN, began shifting its approach to slum upgrading. A meeting between the then head of state and UN-HABITAT Executive Director in 2000 opened discussions between the Government of Kenya (GoK) and UN-HABITAT on how the two could engage in slum upgrading. On 15 February 2003, the government and UN-HABITAT entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under which UN-HABITAT would oversee the Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP), which would cover the three largest Kenyan cities, starting with Nairobi’s largest slum, Kibera. Later, in 2005, the GoK developed specific KENSUP Implementation and Financing Strategies covering the period of 2005-2020 in line with the MDGs’ time frame. According to the government of Kenya, KENSUP’s aim is to “have improved the livelihoods of at least 5.3 million urban Slum dwellers (1.6 million households) by the year 2020 at an estimated cost of Kshs 884 billion or $13 billion” (UN-HABITAT and The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme Strategy Document, May 2008). UN-HABITAT/World Bank Cities Alliance and the government of Kenya donated the seed fund for the program. The program’s main focus is shelter improvement, infrastructure services and land tenure, among other issues (Ministry of Housing, Kenya).

According to the MoU, UN-HABITAT is to provide: technical advice through UN volunteers and consultants; assist with core elements of infrastructure necessary for slum upgrading; assist in the mobilization of financial and other resources for the program, e.g. liaise with donor agencies; and, jointly with the GoK, establish a Slum Upgrading and Low Cost Housing and Infrastructure Fund. The GoK is responsible for the program execution through local counterpart professionals, buildings, training, equipment, materials and supplies as well as financial counterpart contribution (UN-HABITAT, May 2005).

In 2008, Kenya launched Kenya Vision 2030, which is an outline for Kenya’s development until 2030. Its main goal is for urban areas to attain “a well-housed population living in an environmentally-secure urban environment” (Kenya Vision 2030, 2007). In addition, Kenya adopted a new constitution that guarantees every citizen the right to “accessible and adequate housing,” and to reasonable standards of sanitation (Kenya Constitution, 2010). In a bid to fulfill this vision, the government partnered with international development institutions, notably the World Bank, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and Agence Française de Développement (AFD), who would eventually provide loans to develop another slum upgrading program—the Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Program (KISIP)—to complement KENSUP. KISIP was initiated in 2011 and targeted 15 municipalities: Nairobi, Mombasa, Eldoret, Naivasha, Machakos, Malindi, Kakamega, Nyeri, Thika, Kericho, Kitui, Garissa and Embu. The World Bank provided $100 million of the funding, while Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the government of Kenya, contributed $45mn, $10mn and $10mn, respectively.

CONTENT, PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION

The central difference between KENSUP and KISIP is that KISIP has a short-term (5 years, 2011-2016) focus on infrastructure and land tenure in 15 municipalities, while KENSUP is a country-wide, long-term strategy (2005-2025), focusing on housing and other issues.
KENSUP and KISIP are implemented concurrently by the government of Kenya through the Ministry of Housing (MoH) and the Ministry of Lands, and support from relevant local authorities. KISIP is directed by a program coordination team, comprised of staff from both the Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Land, that is responsible for program design, overall program coordination, financial management, procurement, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and reporting. A staff from the Ministry of Housing and the Department of Slum Upgrading manages KENSUP.

Primarily international donors finance the programs. KENSUP is a long-term project and part of the memorandum of understanding between GoK and UN-HABITAT, which established the Slum Upgrading and Low Cost Housing and Infrastructure Fund to serve as a central depository for the funding of slum upgrading programs. Its initial funding came from UN-HABITAT with subsequent financial allocations from the National Budget. KISIP was funded by the World Bank (60%), SIDA and AFD (30%) and the Kenyan government (10%).

Intervention sites for both projects were selected based on the perceived magnitude of informal settlements in Kenya. As of 2013, KENSUP focuses on Kenya’s three largest cities by population: Nairobi (covering housing, Infrastructure and social services), Mavoko in Nairobi (targeting Housing and infrastructure), Mombasa (focusing on social services- schools, markets, health facilities) and Kisumu (targeting social services- schools, markets, health facilities). The first KENSUP project to be implemented was a decanting site in Kibera meant to relocate residents from upgrading sites. Construction in the first village (Soweto East) began in 2012. The houses were composed of 1, 2 and 3 bedroom houses which would be sold to beneficiaries at a below market rate of between Kshs 400,000 – 900,000 ($5000 - $11,250).

KISIP is to be implemented in 15 municipalities: Nairobi, Mombasa, Eldoret, Naivasha, Machakos, Malindi, Kakamega, Nyeri, Thika, Kericho, Kitui, Garissa, Embu. The selection criteria was however more detailed and included the consideration of existing land tenure status, settlement location in relation to environmental sustainability, scale of potential

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>KISIP</th>
<th>KENSUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|**FOCUS** | • Infrastructure strengthening of tenure security  
• Participatory urban planning  
• Strengthening key institutions of urban management  
• Five-year project from 2011-2016 | • Housing/shelter improvement  
• Provision of physical and social infrastructure/amenities  
• Community mobilization, organization & participation  
• Long-term program (2005-2020) |
displacement of residents, size and density of settlements, proximity to trunk infrastructure, community readiness to participate and identify priority activities.

The institutional implementation arrangement of the two projects is as follows:

*Table 2: Implementation Framework*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KENSUP</th>
<th>KISIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Inter-Agency Coordination Committee (IACC) comprising ministry staff (Roads, Public Works, Housing, Lands, Local Government, Water ministry and the Nairobi City Council)</td>
<td>• KISIP Steering Committee chaired by the PS Ministry of Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• KENSUP National Secretariat</td>
<td>• KISIP program coordination team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Program Implementation (PIU) at the housing department at the council</td>
<td>• Central Technical Assistance Team (CTAT) and Technical specialist TAs to carry out activities such as procurement, financial management, M&amp;E, slum upgrading, mapping, surveying and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Settlement Program Implementation Unit (SPIU) based at the settlement level</td>
<td>• KISIP Municipal Coordinator at the municipal level to coordinate to oversee day to day running of the program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) made up of community members in each settlement.</td>
<td>• Municipal Coordination Team (MCT) made up of department heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Municipal Technical Assistance Pools (MTAP) of consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Land Survey Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Settlement Executive Committee (SEC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROJECT OUTCOMES**

Both programs are currently under implementation, but so far, several achievements have been made:

*Table 3: Achievements of KENSUP and KISIP*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KENSUP</th>
<th>KISIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Formation of Settlement Executive Committees in Soweto East and Laini Saba villages in Kibera</td>
<td>• According to a presentation by the KISIP coordinator, the various components have been implemented to some level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Socio-economic mapping of the Kibera settlement</td>
<td>• Institutional strengthening in all 15 municipalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Master plan draft for Kibera under formulation as of 2008 by UN-HABITAT  
• Physical mapping of Kibera under way  
• Housing at Kibera Decanting Site Housing Scheme: 17 blocks of 5-story flats totaling 600 three-room self-contained units | • Land tenure in Nairobi, Mombasa, Eldoret, Malindi, Kakamega, Thika, Kericho, Garissa, Embu                                                                                                                          |
- More units were under construction in 2013 at Soweto village Kibera
- 4.26km spine road under construction as of 2013 in Kibera
- Four cooperatives formed and registered in Soweto East with assistance from the Ministry of Cooperatives
- Construction works for 405 units in progress in Mavoko
- Allocation of $400,000 to Cities Without Slums (CWS) in Kisumu for the construction of schools, clinics, water & sanitation facilities, social halls and markets; most of the classrooms in schools have been constructed
- Infrastructure in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Eldoret, Naivasha, Machakos, Malindi, Nyeri, Embu
- Planning For Urban Growth in all 15 municipalities

**ANALYSIS:**
**STRENGTHS & SUCCESSES**

Both programs enjoy immense government support in terms of financing and human resources. KENSUP was institutionalized through creating a slum development department under the Ministry of Housing. KENSUP has established a slum upgrading fund, the Kenya Slum Upgrading, Low Cost Housing and Infrastructure Fund (KENSUF) which targets about $13 billion for the full implementation of the program. KENSUP also receives allocations from the national budget. The KISIP project also has substantial financial resources—$165 million—through a repayable grant from the World Bank. Although not strongly adopted in practice, community participation is integrated into the project policy. KENSUP envisages use of housing cooperatives as the means to mobilize communities, define ownership and general tenure arrangements. The formation of cooperatives in both Mavoko and Kibera, by the Ministry of Cooperative Development and Management, is already in progress with five housing cooperatives already formed and registered in Mavoko and four in Soweto, Kibera. Both programs are built on collaboration: KENSUP involves GoK and UN-HABITAT while KISIP was developed through the World Bank and implemented by GoK. As a complementary to KENSUP, UN-HABITAT provides water through its Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) program, sanitation and solid waste management in Kibera while Umande Trust is working on Water and sanitation through Water and sanitation for the urban poor (WSUP) program in Kibera.

**WEAKNESSES & CHALLENGES**

Despite strong backing from the government, there are several institutional and program design challenges that have hindered their successful implementation. Both programs are designed with community participation as a key element. However, the process of community participation seems flawed in that communities targeted by the project do not seem to have been fully engaged. KENSUP Kibera decanting site residents claim that the government didn’t involve them in setting up the rent rates (Interview with Kibera
KISIP, though meant to utilize civil society organizations to mobilize communities, did not do so, according to civil society organizations (Civil Society Forum, January 16, 2013). The Ministry of Housing implements the projects; it directs all activities and has to approve all budgets including those by municipalities. Although the officials in the ministry stress that the project has been participatory and community-led, it is clear that decisions are made at the top. Another challenge is a coordination problem between partners. For instance, the Ministry of Housing is supposed to implement KENSUP projects in partnership with UN-HABITAT, but the latter is not involved or aware of the happenings (UN-HABITAT staff, January 15, 2013). Similarly, KISIP and KENSUP are poorly, if at all, linked. Although the two projects are run by the same ministry and target related issues, they rarely seem to feed into each other. There is no clear link on how the projects should complement each other except for remarks not backed by evidence by the ministry officials. An example is the assumption that KENSUP will provide housing after KISIP sorts out land tenure and infrastructure in the 15 municipalities (Professor Jason Corburn, January 18, 2013). Moreover, there are conflict resolution and transparency issues in the selection of municipalities, bidding and contracting processes, insufficient evaluation and a lack of ownership within the community (Civil Society Forum, January 16, 2013). Finally, the programs’ funding is donor-sourced with little direct investment by the Kenyan government, resulting in a lack of sustainability (KISIP, Operations Manual, 2011).

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Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP) available at http://www.housing.go.ke/?cat=18


KENYAN SLUM UPGRADING PROJECTS: HURUMA & MATHARE
MELODY TULIER & KEZIAH MWELU

HURUMA: CONTEXT

Upgrading in Kambi Moto began as an effort by civil society groups in the early 2000s to engage in improving the living conditions of slum dwellers within Kenyan slums after decades of neglect from the government (Weru, 2004). It is one of the six villages in Huruma Informal Settlement located in the Northwest of Nairobi City Centre on council land covering 0.4 hectares. The Kambi Moto settlement, however, covers an area of 0.4 hectares (Bowler & Desrocher, 2005). Fueled by rural-urban migration and an inadequate amount of affordable housing in urban areas, initial settlements within Huruma began forming in the 1970s. Several deadly fires in the settlement, in 1995, 1997 and 1999, attracted the attention of Pamoja Trust, a newly formed civil society organization (Bowler & Desrocher, 2005).

A global campaign for secure tenure, which focused on partnerships, negotiated resettlements and access to land and finance in informal settlements, was launched in 2000 by UN-HABITAT (Weru, 2004). This led to Pamoja Trust initiating its first project in Huruma by carrying out a needs assessment survey, which established pressing community needs in areas of sanitation, health and housing improvement, as well as fears over a constant threat of eviction stemming from unsecured land tenure. Pamoja Trust thus began organizing the community around housing and land security. A detailed intervention framework was developed in conjunction with the community, which involved mobilization through community governance structures, enumeration and mapping, as well as strategies for land tenure; participatory planning and budgeting through housing designs, income sources, management and participatory project implementation and management (Bowler & Desrocher, 2005).

Kambi Moto was selected as the first site for intervention and the community conducted a comprehensive door-to-door enumeration in 2001 to establish the actual population in Kambi Moto village. The needs assessment survey had estimated the population of Huruma to be 6,569 people with an average household monthly income of Kshs 5,000 (Bowler & Desrocher, 2005). Once the community was organized and enumeration negotiations were started with the Nairobi City Council to request land regularization and service provision. In 2003 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the community, Nairobi City Council and Pamoja Trust that declared Huruma a special planning area (Bowler & Desrocher, 2005). This allowed negotiated planning standards. The MoU also outlined the council’s commitment to bequeath land to the community on a community title. Construction began the same year and a total of 36 units were completed in 2005 (Huruma Residents, January 2013).
The program’s key focus was on securing land tenure, improving housing and basic infrastructure and services (Bowler & Desrocher, 2005). Institutional framework and partnerships were seen as key to the project’s success and thus a community organization—Muungano Wa Wanavijiji—was formed to help orchestrate the community’s activities. Community empowerment through training and leadership was also a significant part of the project.

PROCESS

The project was built on the principles of self-organization and savings, recognizing that community involvement and initiative was paramount to sustainability. The role of Pamoja Trust was to train the Kambi Moto community in participatory skills and to provide technical skills and support. Financing by the community through savings amounted to 20% of the project cost, with a loan from AMT covering the remaining 80%. Construction is done incrementally in 3 phases with community providing labor.
IMPACTS

1) Improved housing: Before upgrading, housing comprised of temporary shacks that lacked basic services.
2) Improved health and sanitation: Before upgrading, Kambi Moto village had access to a single pit latrine, besides a block of NCC toilets near sewerage depot that cost 2 Ksh per person per use, based on Pamoja Trust’s needs assessment in 2001.
3) Piped water provision with individual tap water outlets: Initially, residents relied on water vendors.

STRENGTHS & CHALLENGES

Some of the strengths include community participation, incremental upgrading and vertical space utilization reduced displacements, adoption of affordable technology: cost reduction, partnerships with external actors and community empowerment through leadership and savings groups (Bowler & Desrocher, 2005).

The main challenges were a limited scope in terms of units and number of beneficiaries. So far only about 86 units have been completed. The other 5 villages in Huruma, however, got organized and are currently in different phases of upgrading. Moreover, the process is slow and complicated. Communities are forced to choose between housing and short-term needs due to limited resources and diverse community interests.

MATHARE: CONTEXT

In Mathare, 92% of households were tenants and 70% of structure owners were absent (Kemau, 2002); moreover there were complex economic norms with high priced water kiosks and a robust informal economy providing labor to individuals. At the same time, beyond this community context, the national government developed a national Poverty Eradication Strategy and attempted to tap the housing market to develop housing for citizens (Kemau, 2002).

ACTORS

The Archdiocese of Nairobi created the Amani Housing Trust as an executing agency to spearhead slum upgrading projects (Reback, 2007). Specifically, the upgrading was financed by the German government, while the Kenya government provided the land, and Nairobi City Council had primary jurisdiction for building codes, infrastructure and design approval and through a payment scheme it was intended that residents pay for maintenance through rent (Reback, 2007).

CONTENT

The main goal of the project was to improve the living conditions and access to housing of the 25,000 inhabitants in Mathare 4A through the provision of infrastructure coupled with efforts to improve access to utilities and socially acceptable housing and basic services. A
long-term focus plans to create housing that will continue to be affordable to residents, with some becoming property owners (Kamau, 2002).

PROCESS & IMPLEMENTATION

The following timeline details the project progress and hurdles (Reback A, 2007):

1991: Archdiocese establishes Amani Housing Trust as executor of Mathare 4A upgrading project
1992: Site was surveyed and resident needs documented.
1997: The pilot phase was started and intended to impact 6,000 households or 20,000-30,000 individuals. A main road was completed to propel the beginning of the upgrading program.
2000: Upgrading project stopped. Residents dissented after being incited by politicians, whom called for tenants not to pay rent. There was distrust for Amani and it was perceived Amani took the place of former landlords.
2003: Upgrading was restarted and structured were purchased from existing owners.
2007: 98% of infrastructure buildout complete. 50% of housing upgrades complete. Future upgrading plans uncertain as the program is not at a point where it is financially self sustaining.

IMPACTS & OUTPUTS

Long-term impacts have not been documented. However, there are numerous outputs, including a wet core with a toilet, a shower and washing slab for every 10-15 people, improved drainage, 12 meter wide access roads, street lighting and garbage collection points that are no more than 50 meters from every block of houses. Finally, “relocation houses” have been built, although the number is unknown at this point (Kamau, 2002).

INDICATORS

The project’s actors have not established a robust set of indicators. More short and medium term outcomes would be prudent to establish, which would form the foundation for indicators.
Some short-term outcomes could include consistent maintenance of facilities, increased usage of facilities, reduced time spent fetching water. In the medium term this could lead to increased economic productivity and reduction in malaria and dysentery.

CHALLENGES & KEY STRENGTHS

When upgrading did occur after some effort, the lack of community participation and distrust caused the project to stop (Reback, 2007). While not accomplished, project planners had the foresight to consider financing schemes for the project, which are necessary for long-term sustainability. In the future, other projects should also consider creative ways to accomplish this.
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